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Abstract 
 
    This paper investigates the cyclical behaviour of real wages in urban China using the 
China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) 1989-2006. Using changes in the 
unemployment rate as the cyclical measure, we find pro-cyclicality in the public sector 
and small/medium firms, but not in big firms. We also find real wages of male, high 
educated or ever married workers are flexible. Including bonuses increases the pro-
cyclicality of regular wages. 
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Real wage cyclicality in China 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper analyses real wage adjustment over the business cycle using panel micro data 
for urban China 1989-2006. China had a regulated economy which forms an instructive 
contrast with the more flexible economies such as the US and the UK (see Devereux 
2001 for the US; and Devereux and Hart 2006 for the UK). Our aim is to provide a 
factual basis for inquiry, using microeconomic panel data from the China Health and 
Nutrition Survey Data (CHNS). 
In practice, China’s wage-setting institutions are regarded as a dual system (see e.g. 
Song 1990, Peng 1992). On one hand, China is in the transition process of labour market 
(Nee, 1996). From the foundation to the late 1970s, China had essentially no labour 
market (Walder, 1986). The public sector dominates in the urban China, and the Bureau 
of Labour and Personnel centrally determined and controlled the wages of all workers 
through a national grid system. This heavy planning led to poor effect incentive which 
depressed productivity and innovation. This situation changed when China began its 
market reforms. In 1986, the State Council formally introduced individual labour 
contracts to end the system of permanent employment. By the early 2000s, the labour 
market began to determine wages and employment (Meng, 1997; and Freeman 2007).  
On the other hand, China’s system of wage setting is command/market coordinated. 
China’s coordinated wage setting results in wages being more responsive to 
macroeconomic shocks, since coordination assists altering incentives, facilitating 
efficient bargaining, and increasing information, communication, and trust (Lin, 1995; 
Freeman, 2007). In other words, the parties’ gains to changing wages are higher if all 
change, so that there is a “strategic complementarity”. Wage rigidity may be a result of 
coordination failure (see more discussion in Ball and Romer, 1991; Peng and Siebert 
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2008) in wage adjustments. In this paper we directly test whether individual labour 
contracts or such command/market coordination makes real wages responsive to 
macroeconomic shocks in urban China 
 
2. Data and econometric methods 
The dataset used in this paper is the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). The 
survey employs a multistage random-cluster sampling process to draw households from 
nine provinces (Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, 
Liaoning, and Shandong). We use seven waves of CHNS data (1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 
2000, 2004 and 2006) and concentrate on wage earning employees who work in the 
urban areas of the nine provinces. We exclude self-employed workers, workers in 
“Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, fishery and water conservancy” sector, and 
owners of private or individual enterprises because it is difficult to separate their wages 
from the profit income.  
Real hourly wage is real annual earnings divided by annual total working hours. 
Nominal annual earnings, which include regular wages and bonuses from the employer, 
are converted into real annual earnings using corresponding deflators of provincial urban 
CPI (Consumer Price Index) based on year 1995, provided by the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (NBSC). We use changes of the provincial urban registered 
unemployment rates as our cyclical indicator of local labour market, also from the NBSC.  
Our approach offers two advances. First, we use data on real wage movements from a 
panel of individuals rather than aggregate data. Using aggregate data, most studies of real 
wage behaviour have concluded that real wages are at best weakly pro-cyclical in China 
(e.g. Sabin, 1999; Wu, 2004). However, aggregate data ignore the fact that, over the cycle, 
more unskilled workers become employed in expansion and pull the aggregate average 
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wage downwards. The converse occurs in recession. Thus, an aggregate wage series is 
counter-cyclically biased (Solon et al., 1994). For this research, we formed an unbalanced 
panel of 5,978 workers with clear employment information. Total observation number is 
15,885. 
Second, we can avoid the underestimation errors of putting aggregate variable (for 
example provincial unemployment rates) into a regression using micro data. Moulton 
(1986) shows that individuals in the same year/region will share some common 
component of variance that is not entirely attributable either to their measured 
characteristics (e.g., age) or to the aggregate unemployment rate in that year. In this case, 
the error component in simple OLS regression will be positively correlated across people 
in the same year, so we will underestimate the standard error on the unemployment 
variable (also see Shin, 1994). Unfortunately, this problem has been ignored by authors 
on Chinese wage behaviour (Appleton et al., 2005). Again, such a finding might provide 
an insight into the working of labour market institutions in the particular case. Therefore, 
our empirical work uses the standard two-step estimation procedure (beginning with 
Solon et al., 1997) to get round the Moulton (1986) problem. In step 1 we estimate a 
wage change equation using individual data. This equation is given by: 
 
  
    
       
             ∑∑       
 
   
 
   
                                             
 
 
where Wilt  is real average hourly earnings of individual i in province l (l= Guangxi, ..., 
Shandong) and year t (t = 1991, ..., 2006), and s equals 2, 3 or 4 according to whether the most 
recent interview before the year t interview was two, three or four years earlier. Ageit is a cubic 
in age, Rl denotes a province dummy, Yt denotes a year dummy and ilt is a random error 
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term. This step gives us a panel data of wage changes for the workers in province l and 
between t and t-s, that is, αlt.  
In step 2, we then derive estimates of the wage cyclicality of workers by regressing αlt 
on the provincial unemployment change variable (Δult), with provincial fixed effect (Rl) 
and time dummies (Yt). This equation is given by: 
 
   ̂                                                                         
 
In this step, we only have time series variation for each province, reducing the number of 
observations – in our case 6 waves of 9 provinces (actually only 49 observations in the 
step 2 as the wage data of Liaoning are missing in 1997, Heilongjiang missing in 1989, 
1991 and 1993). We use weighted least squares where the weights are the numbers of 
individuals observed in a given year. Our data cover more than one full business cycle in 
China. 
                     
3. Empirical results 
The results for the unemployment change coefficients from equation (2) are reported in 
Table 1. The estimated total wage cyclicality (whole sample, column 1) is negative and 
significant. One point increase in the local unemployment rate would decrease the real 
wage by 6%. We differentiate between the public and private sector and find markedly 
different labour markets.  Real wages of workers in the public sector exhibit significant 
and highly pro-cyclical movements (10.1%), which are also significant and highly pro-
cyclical in small/medium firms (fewer than 100 employees, 9.6%). However, wages in 
the private sector and big firms are rigid.  It appears as though coordinated response to 
economic shock increase wage flexibility in the public sector, but the coordination fails in 
the private sector. Put in another way, for the public sector which is coordinated by 
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command and market, the benefits of coordination are real. However, these benefits do 
not extend to the disadvantaged economic agents in private sector. Big firms may have 
more internal resources to smooth out the business cycle. Workers in small/medium firms 
can have flexible wages by using individual labour contract while they are less 
command/market coordinated. We also find real wages of male, high educated or ever 
married workers are more flexible than others.  
 
(Table 1 around here) 
 
Next, we present three sensitivity tests for our results. Firstly, since we work with 
annual earnings for hourly wage, we require a measure of annual hours. Errors in 
reporting of hours can give rise to spurious cyclicality of wages. In particular, workers 
may report contract hours rather than actual hours worked, causing reported hours to 
remain overly steady from year to year. Such understatement of the cyclicality of hours 
will give an overstatement of the cyclicality of hourly wages. Hence, we present the 
sensitivity test for the annual earnings in column 2, which show very similar cyclicality 
pattern as hourly wage. Thus, we take it that the bias from misreporting of hours is not 
large for our data.  
Secondly, column 3 gives the consequences of nominal hourly wage. While the effect 
of unemployment rate becomes insignificant for the whole sample and males, there is not 
much change in the significant and positive coefficients for workers in the public sector 
and small/medium firms, as well as those high educated and ever married workers. Hence, 
our results do not show a significant negative association between the CPI and 
unemployment rate in urban China, i.e. the Philips curve. 
Finally, Table 1 presents the cyclicality of regular wage (excluding bonuses). Bonuses 
are associated with employers’ profit hence should be more flexible than regular wage. 
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Excluding bonuses from our wage variable may decrease the pro-cyclicality. The final 
column reveals insignificant coefficients for the whole sample and most sub-groups, but 
the pro-cyclicality of real wages of workers in the public sector and small/medium firms 
are still robust. 
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper investigates the cyclical behaviour of real wages in urban China using the 
CHNS 1989-2006. Using changes in the unemployment rate as the cyclical measure, we 
find real wages of workers in the urban areas to be pro-cyclical. We find robust pro-
cyclicality in the public sector and small/medium firms.  
The results suggest that real wages are not sticky in the public sector, suggesting a 
successful process of command/market coordination. The lagging private sector seems 
unable to catch up with the changes. These sticky wages in the private sector are from the 
coordination failure, which cannot help workers keep their jobs as the local labour market 
is tight, as well as get more benefit of economic growth as the local labour market is 
loose. The small/medium firms are also sensitive to the local labour market condition, 
consistent with the development of labour market based on individual contract. However, 
we might argue that big firms prefer the rigid wage setting. The policy conclusion seems 
to be that the coordinated wage-setting institutions give flexible wages in the public 
sector hence urban China. The development of labour market also helps small/medium 
firms to set up flexible individual contracts. However, for lagging private sector and big 
firms, rigid wage may delay recovery. 
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Table 1 Wage and unemployment changes, by workers' characteristics, sector and firm 
size (coefficients on Δut from wage change equation 2) 
 
  Real hourly  
Wage (Regular   
wage + Bonus) 
Real annual  
Earning (Regular  
wage + Bonus) 
Nominal hourly  
Wage (Regular 
wage + Bonus) 
Real hourly  
Wage (only 
Regular wage) 
All -0.060** -0.055* -0.048 -0.049 
  (0.028) (0.029) (0.033) (0.035) 
Public -0.101*** -0.097*** -0.094*** -0.102*** 
  (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.033) 
Private -0.032 -0.023 -0.005 -0.004 
  (0.039) (0.044) (0.048) (0.051) 
Small/Medium  
firms (<100)  
-0.096*** -0.073** -0.074* -0.073* 
(0.036) (0.037) (0.041) (0.044) 
Big firms (>100) -0.042 -0.036 -0.029 -0.025 
(0.031) (0.038) (0.042) (0.042) 
Male -0.069** -0.054* -0.047 -0.052 
  (0.030) (0.031) (0.035) (0.039) 
Female -0.040 -0.048 -0.036 -0.035 
  (0.035) (0.036) (0.040) (0.040) 
High school + -0.075** -0.069** -0.065* -0.056 
  (0.035) (0.033) (0.039) (0.039) 
High school - -0.027 -0.030 -0.014 -0.030 
  (0.038) (0.031) (0.039) (0.042) 
Married -0.065** -0.059** -0.054* -0.054 
  (0.030) (0.029) (0.033) (0.035) 
Single -0.018 -0.035 -0.014 -0.020 
  (0.053) (0.048) (0.061) (0.067) 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels for 
two-tail tests. There are 3,951 individual observations (2,317 in the public sector) in the first step, and 49 
region*year weighted observations for the second step.  
 
